Study on Environmental Policy for Non-Point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly
In an incomplete competition setting, this study examines the efficacy of ambient charges under non-point source (NPS) pollutions. To this end, it constructs a one-stage game and a two-stage game in which Bertrand duopolistic firms choose their best prices and abatement technologies, respectively, following Ganguli and Raju . In both games, it is shown that increasing the ambient charge decreases emissions. This finding implies that, even in a duopoly Bertrand market, the ambient charge can be an effective way to regulate NPS pollutions.
Author (s) Details
Department of Economics, International Center for further Development of Dynamic Economic Research, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan.
Department of Economics, Chukyo University, Nagoya, Japan.
Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary.
View Book :- https://stm.bookpi.org/IEAM-V6/issue/view/40